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The Boom Not The Slump: The Right Time For Austerity
Arjun Jayadev, Mike Konczal | The Roosevelt Institute
Last Updated: August 23, 2010
“The boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity
at the Treasury.” - John Maynard Keynes (1937)
Collected Writings
Should the United States cut its deficit in the short
term?
This has been the subject of intense debate
among politicians, policy analysts and thinkers over the
past year. What are the consequences of cu!ing the
deficit with interest rates low, unemployment high and
growth uncertain?
A recent paper by Alberto F. Alesina and Silvia Ardagna
(2009), “Large Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus
Spending” (henceforth A & A), looks at a cross section of
deficit reduction policies among different countries. It
examines examples where large-scale deficit reduction is
associated with economic expansion and where the
debt-to-GDP ratio falls in the medium-term (3 years
a#er the adjustment). Based on this research, many
popular commentators suggest that the U.S. can adopt
such a policy and grow.1
However, upon a further examination of the data such a
conclusion is unmerited. The overwhelming majority of
the episodes used by A & A did not see deficit reduction
in the middle of a slump. Where they did, it o#en
resulted in a decline in the subsequent growth rate or an
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Of the 26 episodes
that they identify as ‘expansionary’, in virtually none did
the country a) reduce the deficit when the economy was
in a slump and b) increase growth rates while reducing
the debt-to-GDP ratio. The sole example not covered
by those two qualifiers can be explained by a
combination of two policy maneuvers that are not easily
available to the U.S. at the moment: currency
depreciation and interest rate reduction.
We expand on their initial examination and cover the
entire data set of 107 observations, finding very li!le
evidence for success when cu!ing in a slump—in our
terminology, when the growth rate in the previous year
was lower than the average growth rate over the past
three years. Only one additional case out of 107 can be
seen as an example of success in fiscal consolidation,
and we show that this does not bear scrutiny either.

Key Findings
• Countries historically do not cut their deficits in a
slump, instead addressing these problems during a nonrecessionary time.
• When countries cut in a slump, it o#en results in lower
growth and/or higher debt-to-GDP ratios. In very few
circumstances are countries able to successfully cut
during a slump, and this happens only when either
interest rates and/or the exchange rates fall sharply.
• In our analysis, we find that there is no episode in
which a country facing the same circumstances as the
United States (recent recession, low interest rates, high
unemployment) has cut its deficit and succeeded in
reducing its debt through growth.
• We conclude that there is li!le evidence provided by A
& A that cu!ing the federal deficit in the short-term,
under the conditions the United States currently faces,
would improve the country’s prospects. It may even
make the United States’ situation far worse.
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Background

beginning of deficit reduction is greater than 4.5
percent. Seventeen out of their 26 examples qualify.

A & A find what they consider to be evidence of
episodes in which “spending cuts adopted to reduce
deficits have been associated with economic expansions
rather than recessions.” A & A suggest the episodes
they’ve isolated show that reducing the deficit can lead
to an increase in growth. They then use these examples
as a basis for investigating the optimal way to reduce the
deficit.
But what are these examples, and how useful are they to
the United States’ current situation? A & A use a panel
of OECD countries from 1970 to 2007. The countries
included in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
A & A filter this data to find episodes of fiscal
adjustment by capturing years in which the primary
deficit decreased by at least 1.5 percent of GDP. This
leaves them with 107 periods of fiscal adjustment. Such
an approach contrasts with the narrative approaches
taken by Romer and Romer (2007) that were meant to
control for the endogeneity of when to reduce the
deficit. These are abrupt changes in GDP, but whether
or not the primary deficit is being decreased at the
height of a boom or at the bo!om of a slump remains
out of the picture. As we will see, cu!ing at the height
of a boom characterizes many of their results, and as
such is not relevant for the current United States.
They adopt a second filter and take the average growth
rate for the year of the fiscal adjustment and the two
years following and compare it to the average G7 growth
rate (weighted by GDP weights) over the same period.
They identify the top 25% of the difference between
these two growth rates as periods of ‘expansionary fiscal
adjustments’. Note here that an expansion is doubly
relative. First, an episode is expansionary if it is in the
top quartile of the comparisons being made. But the
economy need not be growing quickly (or indeed at all)
for this to happen. Second, a country may be growing
more slowly or even contracting in the three-year period
(inclusive) following the year of adjustment and be
considered expansionary if it is growing at a rate that is
quicker than the G7 growth rate. This unusual definition
selects 26 episodes in which fiscal consolidation takes
place and terms them “expansionary.”
The last filter A& A use to determine whether or not a
deficit reduction is “successful” is if the cumulative
reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio three years a#er the

Examining A&A’s 26 Cases
In examining the data more closely, we seek to see how
much these episodes can be used to provide guidance
for the U.S. economy.2 At the outset, therefore, we
should remember where the U.S. economy is and what it
has just been through. The U.S. underwent a sharp
recession in the last year, growing at -2% in real terms,
according to the OECD data that A & A (and we) use
and was (obviously) lower than the average growth rate
from 2007 to 2009. (We use 3-year windows to be as
close to the A & A windows as possible).
The
unemployment rate is over 9% and probably even higher
in real terms, since there are far more discouraged
workers now than in previous periods. The questions we
wish to ask are: how many of A & A’s expansionary
adjustments occurred in similar circumstances and what
were the outcomes in terms of growth increases in the
country?
Table 1 below provides such an examination, using their
26 episodes. The third column gives the growth rate in
the year of the fiscal adjustment. The fourth column
gives the growth rate in the preceding year. The first
thing to note is that the average real growth rate in the
year preceding is 4.1% across all episodes. In other
words, their examples of successful consolidation
were, on average, growing strongly the year before the
year of adjustment. This is, of course, unlike the U.S.
case today because the country was in recession last
year.
Furthermore, the growth rate in the year preceding the
adjustment was higher than the average growth rate for
the three years preceding the adjustment in most of the
cases (20 out of 26 cases). Why is this important?
Because fiscal consolidation in periods of relative booms
or steady growth is far less likely to be destabilizing than
such actions in periods of slumps. Indeed, it may be
standard Keynesian countercyclical policy in some cases.
Policymakers are far more likely to undertake fiscal
adjustments and to maintain growth in these
circumstances than in others.
It should be noted that in fully 7 of the 26 episodes of
‘expansionary adjustments’ identified by A & A, growth
in the country actually slowed in the three-year period
(inclusive) following the adjustment compared to the
three-year period before the adjustment.
Indeed, growth actually slowed for 4 of the 6 episodes in
which consolidation occurred when the growth rate in
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Table 1: A & A’s Cases of Expansionary Fiscal Consolidation
Country

Year

R e a l
G D P
Growth
Year T

Real GDP
Growth
Rate in
Year T-1

Average
Growth
Rate T-3
to T-1

Average
Growth
R a t e
from T
to T+2

Average
G r o w t h
Rates from
(T to T+2) (T-3 to T-1)

Do they cut in a
slump? (Growth
T- 1
below
average of T-3 to
T-1?)

Is Average Growth
Higher in Post
Adjustment than
Pre-Adjustment?

Spain

1986

3.3

2.3

2.0

4.6

2.7

No

Yes

Spain

1987

5.5

3.3

2.5

5.1

2.7

No

Yes

Finland

1973*

7

7.7

5.1

4.0

-1.1

No

No

Finland

1996

3.7

3.9

2.2

5.0

2.8

No

Yes

Finland

1998

5.2

6.2

4.6

4.7

0.1

No

Yes

Finland

2000

5.1

3.9

5.1

3.1

-2.0

Yes

No

Greece

1976

6.9

6.4

2.7

5.7

3.0

No

Yes

Greece

2005

2.2

4.6

4.6

3.7

-0.9

Yes

No

Greece

2006

4.5

2.2

4.2

3.7

-0.6

Yes

No

Ireland

1976

1.4

5.7

4.9

5.6

0.7

No

Yes

Ireland

1987

4.7

-0.4

2.4

5.2

2.9

Yes

Yes

Ireland

1988

5.2

4.7

2.5

6.5

4.0

No

Yes

Ireland

1989

5.8

5.2

3.2

5.4

2.2

No

Yes

Ireland

2000

9.4

10.7

10.2

7.2

-3.0

No

No

Netherlands

1996

3.4

3.1

2.5

3.9

1.4

No

Yes

Norway

1979

4.4

3.9

4.6

3.5

-1.1

Yes

No

Norway

1980

4.5

4.4

4.1

2.0

-2.1

No

No

Norway

1983

3.9

0.1

2.0

5.1

3.0

Yes

Yes

Norway

1996

5.1

4.2

4.0

4.4

0.4

No

Yes

New Zealand

1993**

6.4

1.1

0.1

5.3

5.2

No

Yes

New Zealand

1994

5.3

6.4

2.1

4.3

2.3

No

Yes

New Zealand

2000

2.4

5.3

2.5

3.6

1.1

No

Yes

Portugal

1986

4.1

2.8

0.2

6.0

5.8

No

Yes

Portugal

1988

7.5

6.4

4.4

6.0

1.5

No

Yes

Portugal

1995

4.3

1

0.0

4.0

4.0

No

Yes

Sweden

2004

4.1

1.9

1.8

3.9

2.1

No

Yes

* Real GDP Growth Was Not Available for 1970 for Finland and Hence the Average Growth Rate from 1970 to 1972 is the Average Growth Rate for 1971 and 1972.
** Real GDP Growth Was Not Available for 1990 for New Zealand and Hence the Average Growth Rate from 1990 to 1992 is the Average Growth Rate for 1989, 1991 and 1992.

the previous year was lower than the three-year average
preceding consolidation.

aided by the ‘Lawson Boom’ in Britain (Ireland’s largest
trading partner at the time).”

So this leaves us with two cases where growth in the
year prior to the deficit reduction was not higher than
the previous three years and growth did not slow a#er
the reduction. The two cases that successfully cut their
deficits in a slump without reducing future growth rates
are: Norway (1983) and Ireland (1987).

As Walsh (1993) shows, the variables in question had
sharp movements.
The DM/Pound interest rate fell
from about 3 DM/Irish Pound to about 2.7 DM/Irish
Pound in 1986 (and stayed at that level for a few more
years). The interest rate differential between Ireland and
Germany and between Ireland and the UK fell sharply. It
dropped from 10% to 5% between mid 1986 and early
1988 for the Irish-German Differential and from about
3.5 % to -1% in the case of the Irish-UK interest rate over
the same period. Figure 1 is taken from Walsh (1993):

Two Specific Cases
Norway (1983)
Norway (1983) interestingly is not a country that A & A
classify as a “Successful Fiscal Consolidation”. The
reason for this is clear from a cursory examination of the
debt-to-GDP ratio. In 1983, the year of consolidation, the
debt was 20.83% of GDP. This rose about 14 percentage
points to 34% of GDP by 1986.3
The other case is indeed a case of unusual success. We
now take a closer look to see if there are ways in which
the U.S. can emulate its experience.
Ireland (1987)
Ireland (1987) is the only case of a fiscal adjustment
when the economy was in a recession the previous year.
It is also a rather well-known case of fiscal consolidation
that has been extensively explored by many scholars,
including Walsh (1993) and Consdine and Duffy (1998).
The Irish struggle over public finances began in 1983 and
involved two a!empts to consolidate. The first period
was from 1983 to 1986 and was remarkably unsuccessful.
The second a!empt, the episode selected by A & A, was
very successful. It is worthwhile to quote Consdine and
Duffy more extensively to understand the difference
between these two periods:
“This first a"empt at fiscal stabilisation coincided
with a downturn in domestic economic activity and
an international economic environment that was less
favourable than in the second half of the decade.
The second adjustment was preceded by a massive
10% devaluation of the Irish pound within the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in August 1986.
This devaluation combined with positive implications of
the fiscal adjustment for foreign direct investment helped
the performance of Irish exports. Investment was
further aided by the continued reduction of the
interest differential with Germany, while exports were

Figure 1. Irish Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
It is not immediately obvious how the growth
experiences of a country with a population roughly the
size of Chicago’s that is undergoing a massive exchange
rate devaluation, while its closest trading partner is
undergoing a once-in-a-decade boom, while also

Copyright 2010, the Roosevelt Institute. All rights reserved.
WWW.ROOSEVELTINSTITUTE.ORG

4

witnessing a decline of about 5% in the interest rate
differential between it and the benchmark interest rates
over the course of a year, is a suitable example to hold
up for the U.S. today. The U.S. today has the benchmark
rate and its interest rate is at the zero bound. In
addition, the U.S. is a large country that cannot rely
extensively on export-led growth—especially when its
major trading partners are also undergoing recessionary
conditions.
A Special Case: Portugal (1995)
One of the cases that does not make it through the filter
we apply but needs further examination is Portugal in
1995. Portugal was growing at only 1% in the year
preceding consolidation and had undergone a recession
two years earlier (in 1993). It therefore bears further
examination. As Jorge Correia da Cunha and Cláudia
Rodrigues Braz show, Portugal’s contractionary fiscal
stance in 1995 as part of its a!empt to join the ERM was
followed by smaller expansionary stances for the next 3
years. But the key difference with the U.S. today was
the ability to lower interest rates and encourage private
investment. Portugal had an interest rate profile in
1995-2000 as follows:
Table 2: Portugal (1995) Interest Rates
Years

Short Term
Interest Rates

Long Term
Interest Rates

1995

9.8%

11.5%

1996

7.4%

8.6%

1997

5.7%

6.4%

1998

4.3%

4.9%

(Data from OECD Stat.)
Once again, there was considerable leeway to lower
interest rates—a policy unavailable to the U.S. today.

Table 3: Cases of Consolidation when the Deficit was
Cut in a Slump
Country

Years

Australia

1987

Austria

1997

Belgium

1982, 1987, 2006

Canada

1981, 1987, 1996, 1997

Spain

1994

Finland

1976, 2000

United
Kingdom

1996, 1997

Greece

2005, 2006

Ireland

1984, 1987

Italy

1976, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997

Japan

1984, 1999, 2006

Netherlands

1973, 1983, 1988, 1993

Norway

1979, 1983, 1989, 2000, 2004

New Zealand

1987, 1989

Portugal

1982, 1983, 1992, 2002

Sweden

1981, 1986, 1987, 1994, 1997

Total Cases

48

Of these, more than half saw reductions in their growth
rates in the years following compared with the years
preceding. The remaining 23 are listed in the table
below.
Table 4: Cases Where Fiscal Consolidation Occurred in
A Slump and Growth Increased

All Cases
In the second step, A & A filtered their results from 107
adjustments to 26. We now turn to the full panel of 107
adjustments to undertake this examination. First, for
most of the cases, consolidation did not take place in a
slump. The following table shows the 48 episodes in
which deficits were cut in a slump:

Country

Years

Australia

1987

Austria

1997

Belgium

1987, 2006

Copyright 2010, the Roosevelt Institute. All rights reserved.
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Country

Years

Canada

1997

Spain

1994

United
Kingdom

1996, 1997

Greece

1994

Ireland

1984, 1987

Italy

1976

Japan

1984, 1999

Netherlands

1983, 1988

Norway

1983, 1989, 2004

New Zealand

1989

Sweden

1986, 1994, 1997

Total Cases

23

As researchers at the University of Oslo and Research
Statistics, Norway show, 1989 was the first year of a very
strong expansionary policy in Norway as a reaction to
the recession of 1988. They note that between 1988 and
1991, “The cyclically adjusted primary deficit increased
by 3.8 per cent of trend GDP”.5

Of these, most of the countries that have the requisite
data (data is missing for debt-to-GDP ratios in the
OECD tables for many years prior to 1980) experienced
rises in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the years following the
adjustment—suggesting that growth increases were
insufficient to generate the revenues required to reduce
debt. We are le# then with 8 cases.
Table 5: Cases Where Fiscal Consolidation Occurred in
A Slump, Growth Increased and Government Debt-toGDP Ratios Fell.
Country

Years

Australia

1987

Belgium

2006

Canada

1997

Ireland

1987

Norway

1989, 2004

Sweden

1986, 1997

Total Cases

8

Of these only two, Norway in 1989 and Ireland in 1987,
are examples that approximate the U.S. experience
today, in that they both experienced recessions in the
year prior to consolidation. We have already considered
the case of Ireland. We are quite puzzled by the
classification of the Norwegian case of 1989 as an
example of a fiscal adjustment. We were unable to
obtain cyclically adjusted primary balances from the
OECD website before 1992, but other information
available makes it somewhat implausible that this year
should be seen as a period of consolidation. It should be
noted that A & A use a different definition of cyclical
fiscal variables, and this is possibly the source of the
contradiction.4

Such a trend is consistent with the OECD’s data on the
cyclically adjusted government primary balance that we
were able to obtain from an online source drawn from
previous reports of the OECD. According to this data,
the Norwegian primary balance went from a 3.0%
surplus relative to trend GDP to a -8.1% deficit by 1991. In
1989, there was a modest decline in the surplus relative
to 1988 of 0.1% of trend GDP—a mild expansion. The
table is reproduced below for the relevant years.
Table 6: Cyclically-adjusted general government primary
balances [Surplus (+) or deficit (-) as a percent of
potential GDP, excludes revenues from Petroleum.]
Year

Government Primary Balance

1986

3.9

1987

3.2

1988

3.0

1989

2.9

1990

1.6

1991

-8.1

The idea that 1989 was a year of fiscal policy expansion,
not contraction, is further supported by Braconier and
Holden (1999). They show that 1989 and later years saw
sharp increases in the discretionary budget for
Copyright 2010, the Roosevelt Institute. All rights reserved.
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expansion. Figure 2, drawn from that paper, makes the
point more clearly.
Figure 2: Norway’s expansion 1989-1991

Looking at the broad spectrum of examples, we cannot
find a situation in which cu!ing the deficit in the middle
of a slump resulted in growth without also devaluing the
currency, increasing debt-to-GDP ratios or decreasing
interest rates.

Table 7. GDP growth using longer growth trends
Episodes of
Fiscal
Consolidation
when Growth in
year t-1 was
lower than
average from t-5
to t-1)

Year

Lagged
Growth
Rates

Does GDP
growth in
years t to t+2
exceed GDP
growth in
years t-3 to
t-1?

Finland

2000

3.9

No

Greece

2006

2.2

No

Ireland

1987

-0.4

Yes

Norway

1979

3.9

No

Norway

1980

4.4

No

Norway

1983

0.1

Yes

Portugal

1995

1

Yes

Sweden

2004

1.9

Yes

An Additional Test Using a Longer Window
We turn now to another filter that is perhaps more
appropriate for determining whether a cut is occurring
in a slump. We have thus far been trying to maintain
consistency with the three year window used by A & A.
Instead of taking the growth rate in the previous year
and comparing it to the average growth rate over the
last three years, we now compare it to the last five years.
The idea is to have a more robust idea of the trend
growth rate in the economy . It should be noted that the
U.S. is indeed in a position where the growth rate in the
previous year was well below the five year average from
2005-2009 (inclusive). In the following table we ask the
same questions that we have asked above.
First, it is important to see that fiscal consolidations very
rarely occur when the growth rate in the year before is
lower than the 5 year average preceding the
consolidation. This occurs for only 8 cases out of 107
where adequate data are available. In 4 of the cases,
the economy is growing robustly in the year preceding.
In only one case, Ireland in 1987, did the economy
recently undergo a recession. One case out 107
resembles the U.S. (superficially), and as we have
showed above, the latitude afforded to policy makers in
that case was far more than what is available to the U.S.
today.

Conclusion
We are living in extraordinary times. This is the largest
recession since the Great Depression. A large part of
the rest of the world is also undergoing a sharp
downturn. There is a genuine and reasonable concern
that public intervention will replace the private debt
overload with a sovereign debt overload. As such,
sound policy advice requires that we recognize what
historical examples are relevant for our current situation.
The A & A data do not appear to provide much solace in
this regard. Their examples of successful consolidation
are typically conditional on cu!ing a deficit during a
boom and not during a slump. There may be situations in
which consolidation does indeed result in be!er
outcomes, but those do not apply to the U.S. at the
moment. It is not clear that immediate fiscal
consolidation will do much to alleviate that worry.
Without robust growth, there is li!le hope of the debtto-GDP ratio falling. The hope in undertaking such steps
is for private investment to be reignited by increased
trust and faith in the viability of government finances.
While this may be a reasonable hope in some situations,
the prospects for such a revival in the U.S. appear bleak.
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Paper has been updated with fixes to typos in text, forma"ing
in Table 1 and references to a count of total examples in text.

Endnotes

Brooks, David (2010). “Prune and Grow”. New York
Times Editorial h!p://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/
opinion/11brooks.html?_r=1&hp,

1.
For example see David Brooks (2010), who
approvingly citing Alberto Alesina’s paper and
suggesting that it be taken as guidance for the US.

Da Cunha, Jorge Correia and Cláudia Rodrigues Braz
“Public Expenditure and Fiscal Consolidation in
Portugal” available at www.bancaditalia.it/studiricerche/
convegni/a!i/publ_expe/iii/709-746_cunha_braz.pdf

2. Ryan Avent (2010) has considered a couple of
examples that A & A use and suggests that they are not
very useful for policy guidance. We argue that virtually
none of the cases they look at are.

Romer, Christina D and David Romer (2007), “The
Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates
Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks”.NBER
Working Paper No 13264.

3. This is most likely because the lower addition to debt
was not matched by a sufficiently large addition to GDP
to reduce the debt.

Walsh, B, (1993), Credibility, Interest Rates and the ERM:
The Irish Experience, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 55, issue 4, p. 439-52

4. A & A correct various components of the government
budget for year to year changes in the unemployment
rate. As they note : “More precisely, the cyclically
adjusted value of the change in a fiscal variable is the
difference between a measure of the fiscal variable in
period t computed as if the unemployment rate were
equal to the one in t − 1 and the actual value of the fiscal
variable in year t − 1. We prefer this method to more
complicated measures like those produced by the
OECD because the la!er are a bit of a black box based
upon many assumptions about fiscal multipliers upon
which there is much uncertainty.” (page 7)).

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the
Roosevelt Institute, its officers, or its directors.

Special thanks to Padma Krishnan for valuable research
assistance and Bryce Covert for editorial content.

5. By the OECD definition. By the government’s own
statistics, the expansion was even larger.
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